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IN THE SUPRElllE COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
M. S. COSTELLO,
Respondent,
vs.
JOHN I. KASTELER, and URANIUM
CHEJ\IIICAL CORPORATION,
a Corporation,

Case
No. 8759

Appellants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(Respondent will be referred to as plaintiff and
appellants will be referred to as defendants herein.)
Plaintiff agrees, generally, with the statement of
facts set forth by defendants in their brief.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING RESPONDENT TO AMEND HIS AMENDED COMPLAINT.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST
THE APPELLANTS, WITH INTEREST, ON THE BASIS OF
THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE SERVICES RENDERED.
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POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANTS JOHN I. KASTELER
AND URANIUM CHEMICAL CORPORATION, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY, OR, IF THE ·COURT ERRED, THE ERROR
SHOULD BE CORRECTED BY THIS COURT OR BY REMAND TO THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT A RETRIAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING RESPONDENT TO AMEND HIS AMENDED COMPLAINT.

Both the original complaint and the amended complaint, prior to the amendment complained of, contained
an allegation that the reasonable value of said services
is the sum of $1,155.00 (Tr. 1, 8, 9).
The trial court permitted plaintiff to amend his
amended complaint at trial prior to the presentation of
any evidence, over defendant's objection. Defendants, in
the third paragraph of their brief, p.age 7, concede that:

"* * * the court permitted the plaintiff to
amend his amended complaint by interlineation to
insert the following words both in the cmnplaint
and in the prayer (emphasis ours) of the complaint, to ·wit: 'or the reasonable Yalue of said
services.' "
In pern1itting the a1nendment over defendants' objection, the trial court took the position that the inclusion
of the allegation of reasonable value in both the original
complaint and the amended con1plaint, prior to the amend-
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ment complained of, constituted adequate notice to defendants that plaintiff would proceed on the theory of
an express contract or upon the doctrine of quantum
meruit, and that defendants had an opportunity to meet
the issues presented.
In support of the trial court's position, we cite the
following:

Christensen v. Johnson, 61 P. 2nd. 697, Utah.
The essential facts of the Christensen vs. Johnson
case as they relate to this case are .as follows : Plaintiff
filed a complaint for services rendered in which it was
alleged, in part, as follows:
"'Between the 9th day of April, 1952, and the
14th day of March, 1953, plaintiffs performed professional services for said defendant at his special
instance and request, which said services consisted
of * * * ; that said services were of the fair and
reasonable value of $300.00, which sum defendant
agreed to pay for said services upon completion
thereof.'''
The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiffs
and defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed
judgment for plaintiffs and on page 600, in part, said:
"As we understand appellant, he claims that
there is a material variance between the allegations of the complaint and the evidence given in
support thereof in that (1) the complaint is founded upon an express contract while plaintiff's evidence at most merely tends to support a cause
of action based upon the doctrine of quantum
meruit and (2) * * *. Neither of such contentions
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[referring to (1) and (2)] can be successfully
maintained. It will be observed that it is alleged
in the complaint that the services were rendered
at the special instance and request of the defendant and that the fair and reasonable value thereof
is $300.00. Such allegations state a cause of action
without the allegation that defendant promised to
pay for the services. * * *"
Rule 15 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 1953,
provides, in part :

"* * * otherwise a party may amend his
pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires."
Rule 15 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Proced1.tre, 1953.
provides, in part :

"* * * if evidence is objected to at the trial
on the ground that it is not within the issues made
by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings
to be amended when the presentation of the merits
of the action will be subserved thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in
maintaining his action or defense upon the 1nerits.
The court shall gr.ant a continuance, if necessary,
to enable the objecting party to n1eet such evidence."
The trial court decided that justice required that the
mnend1nent be allo·wed. Defendants failed to convince
the court that the amendn1ent and the ad1nission of evidence pursuant to the mnend1nent ·would prejudice defendants or that grounds for .a continuance existed.
In view of the Christensen v. Jolin sou case, it appears
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that it would have been proper for the court to admit
evidence at the trial of this case on the theory of quantum
meruit under the amended complaint without the amendment which was allowed. If this is so, defend~nts could
not complain of the amendment nor could they clain1
surprise. In any event, it appears that after leave to
amend was granted, the trial court could decide the case
on the theory of quantum meruit. It is noted that Mr.
Kasteler gave evidence as to the reasonable value of
the services rendered, but the trial court chose to believe
the evidence of plaintiff (Tr. 51).
The citation on page 8 of defendants' brief shown
as "71 C.J.S. at Page 496, Par. 281 ;" is out of context.
The full par.agra.ph in which the quotation appears is
as follows:
71 C.J.S.J Section 281) pp. 596-597.

* * *
"Surprise. If an amendment, in other respects
proper, does not surprise the adverse party, it
may be properly allowed, and leave to amend will
be liberally granted where the proposed amendment will not so change the case .as to cause surprise to the other party. On the other hand, no
party should be called into court prepared to try
one issue and then be required to try another,
of which he then for the first time has notice,
and the discretion of the court should be exercised
so as to prevent surprise. Whether or not an
amendment will cause surprise depends largely
on circumstances.

"* * * "
The citation on page 8 of defendants' brief shown
as "71 C.J.S. at Page 602, Par. 282 ;"is out of context. ThE'
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full paragraph 1n which the quotation appears 1s as
follows:
71 C.J.S., Section282, pp. 601-602.

"* * *
"In general, pleadings may be .amended at or
during the trial, the allowance or refusal of
amendments at such time being largely within the
discretion of the trial court and dependent on
the character of the proposed amendment. It is
error for the court arbitrarily to refuse a trial
amendment where such amendment is required in
the interest of justice. On the other hand, under
the general rule that an amendment will be refused
where it would be prejudicial to the rights of the
adverse party, as discussed Section 281 b, ~n
amendment at the trial will not be allowed where
it would so result. The opposite party will be
granted an opportunity to make a showing for a
continuance, if surprised by an amendment allowed
at the trial.
"* * * "
Regarding the citation on page 8 of defendants'
brief, 100 P. 848, Bowers, et uJ~. v. Good, et ux., Washington, the complaint in this case alleged an express contract, breach and sought damages. Respondents answered
with a general denial. On the day of trial respondents
filed over appellant's objection an amended answer in
which the respondents denied the contract as alleged
by appellants and set up an .affirmative defense of an
oral contract of sale, failure of respondents to perform,
settlernent and a release. The appellants contended that
the court committed error in pennitting an amended
answer to be filed on the day of trial, that a new issue
had been raised and that appellants were not prepared.
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The court held that the objection was not well taken
and the amendment was upheld. It appears that this
citation is dicta.
Regarding the citation on page 9 of defendants'
brief, Safeway Cab Service Company of Oklahoma City
v. Gadbury, 27 P. 2nd 434 Oklahoma, this was a personal
injury c.ase wherein the trial court permitted an amendment of the petition which alleged a back injury to allege
that the accident augmented a prior osteoarthritic condition. The appellate court held that this did not constitute error. It appears that this citation is dicta.
In view of the foregoing, we submit that the trial
court committed no error in allowing the amendment.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST
THE APPELLANTS, WITH INTEREST, ON THE BASIS OF
THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE SERVICES RENDERED.

If defendants in Point II of their brief, are arguing
that there was no express contract, plaintiff admits that
the trial court expressly decided that the contract involved was a contract implied in law for the reasonable
value of the services rendered.
If defendants are contending that the decision and
findings of the trial court on the basis of an implied
contract are not supported by the evidence, plaintiff
contends that the evidence adequately supports the decision and findings. We cite the following: Plaintiff
testified that defendant Kasteler requested plaintiff to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
perform services and did not identify himself as the
agent of the Uranium Chemical Corporation ( Tr. 18, 19,
20). Plaintiff testified he performed the services (Tr.
26), and it was stipulated that 770 tons of e.arth were
hauled by plaintiff (Tr. 28). Plaintiff testified as to the
reasonable value of the services performed (Tr. 29, 30).
Defendants also gave testimony as to the reasonable
v;alue of said services ( Tr. 51).
The trial court found defendant John I. Kasteler
contacted plaintiff and requested plaintiff to perform
services, found that John I. Kasteler did not identify
himself as the agent of the U raniurn Chemical Corporation, found that $1.50 per ton was the reasonable value
of said services, and found that U raniurn Chemical Corporation received the benefit of said services (Tr. 70,
71).
The other matters argued by defendants which relate
to the propriety of the amendment and the opportunity
of defendants to produce witnesses .are dealt with in
Point I of this brief.
Defendants further state that the trial court chose
to disregard certain testimony. \Yeighing the evidence
and judging the credibility of the witnesses is the proper
function of the trier of fact, and the decision of the trial
court as to these matters is entitled to considerable
weight on .appeal.
It is submitted that the trial court did not err in
rendering judg1nent .against both defendants with interest, on the basis of reasonable value of said selTires for
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any of the reasons cited by defendants in Point II of
their brief.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANTS JOHN I. KASTELER
AND URANIUM CHEMICAL CORPORATION, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY, OR, IF THE COURT ERRED, THE ERROR
SHOULD BE CORRECTED BY THIS COURT OR BY REMAND TO THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT A RETRIAL.

Although there are different rules, the majority
opinion in the United States seems to be that after discovery of the undisclosed principal for whom the agent
was .acting, judgment cannot ordinarily be had against
both the principal and agent. However, the cases are in
conflict under the "Pennsylvania view,'' and the California cases apply a well-considered modification or
exception to the general rule. It is clear that both the
agent and the undisclosed principal may be sued in the
same action under any of the theories mentioned.
Defendants contend that it is the obligation of plaintiff to elect whether he will take judgment against the
agent or the undisclosed princip.al. The California cases
require the agent or the undisclosed principal to require
an election or the right is waived and judgment may be
granted against both.
At page 14 of their brief, defendants cite the case
of Love, et al. v. St. Joseph Stockyards Company, 169
Pacific 951, Utah. The facts of this case show that the
agent was given a written release and thereafter an
action was instituted against the undisclosed principal.
The trial court dismissed the action, the plaintiff appe.aled
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and this court affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this case
does not decide the point in issue. Plaintiff has not
located a Utah case which directly resolves the issue.
On page 15 of defendants' brief, defendants cite
from the case of Ewing v. Hayward, et al., 195 Pacific
970, California, (1920). This is an action against Hayward
and others .as co-partners. The trial court gave judgment
against all defendants jointly and defendant, the Newmark Grain Company, appealed. On page 974, the court
states, in part:
"The evidence being insufficient to support
the finding of agency, the judgment c.annot stand.
It is therefore needless to discuss any other point
urged. The judgment is reversed as to the defendant, Newmark Grain Company."
The quotation from the above case cited by defendants on page 15 of their brief is from a concurring opinion
written by P. J. Finlayson, is dicta and does not set
forth the California law on the point in issue.
The annotation in 118 A.L.R. at page 707 reads, in
part, as follows:

"b. Waiver of right to compel election. It
has been held that the rule that the plaintiff before
the close of the case must elect whether he will
take judgment against the one or the other is
subject to an exception, or Inodification, which
holds that the right to compel an election is waived
by failure to dmnand or n1ove for that re1nedy
during the course of the trial. Ora ig v. Buckley
(1933) 218 Cal. 78, 21 P. (2nd) 430. (Citing other
c.ases) * * *."
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In a 1951 case upholding a judgment against both
undisclosed principal and agent, the California court, in
JicEwen v. Taylor, 234 P. (2nd) at page 757, said in part:
"Concerning appellant's contention that in
taking judgment against Doudouris, respondent
elected to hold him and release appellant, it appears in the foregoing quotation from Klinger v.
Modesto Fruit Company, that our courts have held
that in such an action as this, election is not required until and unless the party entitled to the
benefit of an election seeks by motion or otherwise to compel the election to be made and if no
such action be taken by him, then he has waived
the right to compel such an election, and judgment
against both the agent and undisclosed principal
may be upheld. (Citing cases) * * *."
At page 759, the same court said, in part:
"* * *the right to an election operates in favor
of the principal and agent, and it is their duty to
seasonably make the demand. Such duty does not
rest upon the plaintiff or third party creditor.
(Citing cases) * * *."
In the case of Joseph Melnick Bu·ilding and Loan
~1ssociation, et al. v. Link Building and Loan Association, et al., 64 A. (2d) 773, Pennsylvania, (1949), the
Pennsylvania court said at page 776, in part:
"This court has decided that the third party
has the option to proceed against either the agent
or his principal, or both, but is entitled to one
satisfaction. (emphasis theirs). This principle was
established in the leading case of Beymer v. Bonsall, 79 Pa. 298, which has been consistently followed. (Citing cases) * * *."
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The same court further states at page 777, in part:
"If under the Pennsylvania rule, the third
person may proceed against either the agent or
the undisclosed principal or both, the liability is
joint and several. (emphasis theirs) (Citing cases)

***"
The Pennsylvania view permits pursuit of both agent
and principal until the claim is satisfied and follows
the analogy of the prevailing American law allowing a
creditor beneficiary a similar double right. Under the
Pennsylvania rule no exception is necessary to justify
what are exceptions under the other view, pern1i tting
judgment against both the agent and principal if the
objection has been waived because not made in time.
Under the evidence and the findings here, whether
the Utah law is controlled by the general rule or the
modifications or exceptions to it, plaintiff would have
been entitled to judgment against defendant John I.
Kasteler as the agent of an undisclosed principal or
against Uranium Chemical Corporation, the undisclosed
principal, if an election had been made, whether the
duty to require an election is upon plaintiff or defendants.
The issues have been fully tried and it would be a useless
act to require a new trial on these issues if the decision
and findings of the trial court are supported by the
evidence, which we submit they are.
Should the Supren1e Court of the State of Utah
decide so to do, they have the power to strike the judgment against one of the defendants or remand the case
to the trial court with directions to strike one of the
defendants upon the election of plaintiff. If the eourt
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should decide that judgment against one of the defendants
should be stricken, the plaintiff is willing to elect, and
hereby does elect, to hold defendant John I. l{asteler
liable as the agent of an undisclosed principal and stipulates that the judgment against defendant U rani urn
Chemical Corporation may be stricken.
Respectfully submitted,
GREENWOOD

E. EARL

and

SwAN

and

GREENWOOD, JR.

Attorneys for Respondent
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